The Philosophy of Intellect of Robert Grosseteste by Hendrix, John S
Roger Williams University
DOCS@RWU
School of Architecture, Art, and Historic
Preservation Faculty Publications
School of Architecture, Art, and Historic
Preservation
2008
The Philosophy of Intellect of Robert Grosseteste
John S. Hendrix
Roger Williams University, jhendrix@risd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/saahp_fp
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation at DOCS@RWU.
It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hendrix, John S., "The Philosophy of Intellect of Robert Grosseteste" (2008). School of Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation
Faculty Publications. Paper 3.
http://docs.rwu.edu/saahp_fp/3
  
 
The Philosophy of Intellect of 
Robert Grosseteste 
 
 
Robert Grosseteste first studied at the Cathedral School of Lincoln, serving 
Bishop Hugh of Lincoln as clerk. In the 1190s Grosseteste was a clerk of the 
Bishop at Hereford. The Cathedral School of Hereford was a center for Ara-
bic learning in the late twelfth century. Grosseteste became familiar with Ar-
istotle, Arabic scientific treatises, and the Neoplatonism filtered through 
works such as the Theology of Aristotle, Fons Vitae or Liber de Causis. His 
most important writings can be seen as a mixture of these three sources in 
combination with Christian theology, in particular Augustine, Gregory, and 
Boethius, as he owned copies of De Civitate Dei, Moralia in Job, and De 
Consolatione Philosophiae. In his late career, Grosseteste translated the Ce-
lestial Hierarchy, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Divine Names, and Mystical 
Theology of Pseudo-Dionysius. In early treatises such as his Hexaemeron 
and Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, written between 1228 and 
1235, Grosseteste developed a philosophy of intellect, influenced by Greek 
and Arabic commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, which contain Neopla-
tonic influences. In the De anima of Aristotle, Book III, a productive intel-
lect is distinguished from a potential intellect. In the De Anima of Alexander 
of Aphrodisias, the productive intellect is the active intellect, or nous poi-
etikos, and the potential intellect is the material intellect, or nous hylikos. 
The material intellect is perfected as intellection as intellectus in habitu in 
discursive reason or dianoia, which Grosseteste follows. The nous poietikos 
is taken as a purely spiritual substance acting on human intellect, as in the 
intelligentia of Grosseteste. The capacity for receiving the influence of the 
nous poietikos is the material intellect, the nous hylikos, through which 
knowledge is acquired.   
      Avicenna in the Liber Naturalis and Averroes in the Long Commentary 
on the De anima, along with Alfarabi, in the Risala or De intellectu, influ-
enced the thinking of Latin scholastics in the concept of the active intellect 
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as the incorporeal agent leading the potential, material intellect to actuality, a 
concept which can also be found in the De intellectu of Alexander of Aphro-
disias, and the Fons Vitae of Avicebron. Avicebron described the active in-
tellect as a transcendent and incorporeal, cosmic intellect, similar to the way 
it was described in the Paraphrase of the De anima of Themistius, illuminat-
ing the anima rationalis, or rational soul. According to Roger Bacon, Adam 
Marsh accepted the incorporeal active intellect as a divine intellect, as influ-
enced by the Greek and Arabic commentators on Aristotle, as did Robert 
Grosseteste, who distinguished a divine or cosmic intellect, intelligentia, 
from an active intellect, virtus intellectiva, which actualizes a material intel-
lect, virtus scitiva or virtus cogitativa.  
      This distinction can be found in the writings of Roger Bacon, Albertus 
Magnus, and John Peckham. These three writers, along with Grosseteste, 
Adam Marsh, and William of Auvergne, also see the divine intellect, the in-
telligentia, as illuminating the anima rationalis, in the irradiato spiritualis of 
the lumen spiritualis, reflected spiritual light, in the synthesis of Aristotelian, 
Neoplatonic, and Christian influences. In Grosseteste’s thought, the passive 
intellect is defined as the virtus scitiva or virtus cogitativa, as a form of dia-
noia, the agent intellect is defined as the virtus intellectiva, and the Intelli-
gence is defined as the intelligentia, as in the First Cause of the Liber de 
Causis. As in the Liber de Causis, for Grosseteste the material intellect in the 
lower part of the soul acts according to the impressions received of intelligi-
bles from the intelligentia, as illuminated by the irradiato spiritualis, the in-
ner light, and reflected as in a mirror.  
      In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Grosseteste, which con-
tains his most extended commentary on Aristotle’s conception of intellect, as 
light emanates from the sun, intelligibles are illuminated in the mind, or ocu-
lus interior. The intellectus in mind, virtus intellectiva or nous, abstracts uni-
versal ideas from the particulars of sense to form principles, but intelligentia 
functions without a corporeal agent, and is assisted by Divine illumination. 
The universal is the form or species, and is seen as a cause or principle of be-
ing. The universal exists in re in a particular thing, and causes the thing to be 
what it is. The universal or species also exists post rem in intellectus, as an 
abstraction from a particular thing, or intelligible. The principia essendi in 
the thing become the principia conoscendi in the mind. In the Commentary 
on the Physics of Grosseteste, written around 1230, the principia essendi of a 
thing, its form or species, are the subject of human knowledge at three differ-
ent levels. At the first level, it is the subject of ontology and natural philoso-
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phy. At the second level it is the subject of mathematics and geometry, as the 
universal is abstracted from the particular in the principia conoscendi. At the 
third level, it is the subject of metaphysics, as the principia conoscendi par-
ticipate in the virtus intellectiva and Divine illumination.  
      The three levels of human knowledge of the principia essendi correspond 
to the three levels of intellect outlined by Grosseteste in his sermon Ecclesia 
Sancta Celebrat. Ratio, reason, is capable of grasping the objects of the natu-
ral sciences. The virtutes intellectiva et intellectualis are capable of appre-
hending the first principles of science and intelligibles. Intelligentia is the 
participation of Divine illumination in intellect. In the Ecclesia Sancta, the 
noblest capacity of human nature is the desire to know the lux spiritualis, the 
spiritual light, in the intelligentia. In the Commentary on the Posterior Ana-
lytics of Grosseteste, intelligentia is the supreme faculty of the soul. It is a 
form of knowing which does not depend on sense perception or abstraction 
in reason, or any material form, but rather on direct irradiation of the lux 
spiritualis. In the Hexaemeron, intelligentia is described as a faculty of con-
templation, with no connection to phantasia, imagination, or ratio. Follow-
ing Augustine in De Trinitate, intelligentia is divided into memoria, 
intelligentia, and amor, in the contemplation of the Trinity without material 
phantasm, species sensibilis, or corporeal instruments, phantasia and ratio. 
Ratio and imaginatio, and bodily operations themselves, operate in imitation 
and the reflection of the similitudo of intelligentia. 
      In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, intelligentia is described 
as the highest part of the anima rationalis, which is seen as separate from 
corporeal motions and operations. In the treatise De statu causarum, the an-
ima rationalis is described as an incorporeal intelligence mediating corporeal 
virtus, the motion of which in the senses are the phantasmata, mnemic resi-
dues of sense impressions, of the imaginatio. The body is seen as an instru-
ment in relation to anima rationalis, and only influences the soul indirectly. 
In the treatise De intelligentis of Grosseteste, as the higher form of substance, 
the incorporeal soul can be active in the body, but the body cannot be active 
in the incorporeal substance. This is also expressed in the Hexaemeron and 
the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics. The soul is seen as distinct from 
the body. In the Hexaemeron the action of the body is compared to that of a 
mirror that acts by means of reflections, created by the irradiatio spiritualis, 
the illumination provided by the intelligentia of the higher soul, which is also 
reflected in the virtus intellectiva and the virtus cogitativa, the lower levels 
of the rational soul and the mechanisms of cognition in which the intelligen-
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tia participates.  
      In the Hexaemaron, sense perception is defined as the power of receiving 
and grasping sensible likenesses without matter, that is, the senses receive 
the species or eidos of the corporeal object and not the object itself. Sense 
perception, as a lower part of the anima rationalis, is passive or potential in 
relation to the ability of the anima rationalis to know or comprehend con-
cepts, in the virtus cogitativa, or intelligibles, in the virtus intellectiva. The 
anima rationalis is activated or becomes more attentive when the body is 
acted upon, when the senses are stimulated. Sense perception itself is stimu-
lated when the anima rationalis is able to free itself to some degree from the 
corporality of the body which it inhabits, and to overcome its own passivity. 
The anima rationalis, as the source of the movement of the body, pushes 
against the passivity of the corporeal body. As it encounters more difficulties 
in its task, it becomes more attentive. The anima rationalis is aware of the 
difficulties caused by its pushing against the body’s passivity, and as a result 
sense perception is painful or troublesome, and causes turbulence in the ani-
ma rationalis.  
      The passivity of the body is overcome when the passion of the body, the 
amore or affectus mentis, caused by the multiple particulars of sense percep-
tion and the passivity of the body, fits with the working of the soul, when the 
species of sense perception is corresponded to the intelligible, the species 
sensibilis is corresponded to the species apprehensibilis, resulting from inte-
rior illumination, irradiato spiritualis, and the turbulence of the cooperation 
between anima rationalis and body can be overcome, and the illumination of 
the oculus mentis can function adequately so that the anima rationalis is at 
peace in its activation in intellection. The anima rationalis is aware of the 
peace that it can achieve in its overcoming of the passivity of the body, and 
thus aspires to the higher forms of intellection, virtus intellectiva, which ne-
cessitates a freedom from corporeal desires in the higher parts of the anima 
rationalis. 
      In the De motu supercaelestium of Grosseteste, the faculty of sense per-
ception is controlled by the vis apprehensiva of the anima rationalis, and its 
primary goal is only that of self-preservation. Sense perception is assisted by 
sensus communis; imaginatio, the formation of the phantasmata in the oculus 
mentis; and memoria; as such it allows knowledge to be possible, the scien-
tia, knowledge gained by abstraction in reason, and the intellectus, the 
knowledge of first principles or intelligibles; but sense perception is not the 
cause of knowledge. Sense perception alone cannot apprehend universals, 
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which are the materials of knowledge. In the Commentary on the Posterior 
Analytics, sense perception alone can perceive things only in a particular sig-
nified place and time; it can only perceive a particular, without the context 
given by intellectus and intelligentia. As space and time, intelligibles in the 
virtus intellectiva, are the conditions of sense experience, sense experience 
cannot be the cause of scientia, or virtus scitiva, or virtus intellectiva, alt-
hough it acts as a mediator or instigator in the intellective process. It is up to 
the intellectus to combine and differentiate the particular qualities of objects 
as given by sense perception. 
      Because the species sensibilis, the form of the object, in sense perception 
is connected to material objects, sense perception restricts the incorporeal 
virtus of intellectus to a certain extent. In the Commentary on the Posterior 
Analytics, the intelligentia, as the highest part of the anima rationalis, has 
complete knowledge of both singulars and universals, because it is illuminat-
ed by a radiated light, the irradiato spiritualis, or lumen spiritualis, and it is 
separated from the heavy, clouded body in sense perception, in the same way 
that the anima rationalis is separated from the body. As such, intelligentia is 
separated from the phantasmata of corporeal objects in the imaginatio, the 
lower function of intellectus, and from the desire or amore created in the re-
lation between the virtus intellectiva and the phantasmata, the affectus men-
tis, the desire created by the multiple and fragmented images of perception as 
constructed in the virtus cogitativa or virtus scitiva. Sense perception sup-
ports the anima rationalis, but it is lower and separated from it, and is caused 
by it rather than being the cause of it.  
      The body corrupts the purity of the eye of the soul, the oculus mentis, 
making it cloudy and heavy. The virtus of the anima rationalis tends to be 
focused on bodily and material things, on the body the motion of which it is 
the source, and such a focus tends to lull the virtus of the higher intelligenc-
es, the virtus intellectiva, to sleep, restricting the incorporeal virtus, and re-
stricting the ability of intellectus to engage the virtus intellectiva and aspire 
to or be open to the intelligentia. The virtus scitiva and virtus cogitativa are 
more weighed down by the corporeal species sensibilis in the phantasmata of 
the imaginatio, and are limited in their abilities of intellection. Scientific, 
discursive and dialectical reasoning are limited in their functioning, limited 
in their capacity of apprehension, vis apprehensiva, and limited in their un-
derstanding of the functioning of intellect and knowledge in philosophical 
terms. They are limited in their ability to grasp the creative and generative 
functions of intellect. 
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      In Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Mystical Theology of Pseudo-
Dionysius, intelligentia functions independently of ratio, intellectus, and 
phantasia, or imagination. Grosseteste compares intelligentia to the intellec-
tus agens, agent intellect, and actio intellectus, active intellect, the intellects 
which are differentiated from the passive, material intellect, discursive rea-
son, in the De anima of Aristotle. In the Commentary on the Posterior Ana-
lytics, the origin of the principia essensi or universals is inaccessible to 
cognition or knowledge, as they are the product of the intelligentia, so they 
exist in an inchoate state as potentials, and are drawn out from potential to 
action, in a possible or material state which is in the beginning passive and 
not active. This reflects the structure of intellect as described by Aristotle, in 
the relation between the potential, passive or material, agent and active intel-
lects. The principia essendi are brought from potential to active in sense per-
ception, which again is the foundation for knowledge, the knowledge of 
universals, principia conoscendi, but not the cause. This is also described in 
Grosseteste’s De Libero Arbitrio. As knowledge of the thing itself is impos-
sible, scientific knowledge is based on the universals, the principia essendi 
ante rem, which are elicited through sense perception, as illuminated by the 
irradiato spiritualis in the oculus mentis. The principia essendi become the 
material for scientific demonstration, as science cannot be based on the cor-
ruptible and variable knowledge of singulars and particulars given by sense 
perception alone.  
      As human intellect does not have complete access to either the particulars 
of the sense world or the principia essendi that correspond to those particu-
lars in intellect, absolute knowledge and comprehension is impossible, most-
ly because of the corporeal instrument to which intellection is attached. The 
anima rationalis does not have perfect vision in the oculus mentis of the 
principia essendi which are illuminated by the irradiato spiritualis of intelli-
gentia, as it is clouded by its connection to the body. The goal of intellection, 
of intellectual activity, is to uncloud the lens of the oculus mentis as much as 
possible, to purify the anima rationalis of its corporeal connections, and to 
aspire to see the principia essendi as clearly as possible, though ultimately 
completely clear vision is not possible. The goal of intellection is to uncloud 
the lens of the oculus mentis in the anima rationalis so that it can receive as 
much as possible the irradiato spiritualis which illuminates the intelligibles 
and allows the mind to have clear understanding.  
